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Abstract—Cyber-physical systems increasingly rely on dis-
tributed computing platforms where sensing, computing, actu-
ation, and communication resources are shared by a multitude
of applications. Such ‘cyber-physical cloud computing platforms’
present novel challenges because the system is built from mobile
embedded devices, is inherently distributed, and typically suffers
from highly fluctuating connectivity among the modules. Archi-
tecting software for these systems raises many challenges not
present in traditional cloud computing. Effective management of
constrained resources and application isolation without adversely
affecting performance are necessary. Autonomous fault manage-
ment and real-time performance requirements must be met in
a verifiable manner. It is also both critical and challenging to
support multiple end-users whose diverse software applications
have changing demands for computational and communication
resources, while operating on different levels and in separate
domains of security.
The solution presented in this paper is based on a layered
architecture consisting of a novel operating system, a middle-
ware layer, and component-structured applications. The compo-
nent model facilitates the construction of software applications
from modular and reusable components that are deployed in
the distributed system and interact only through well-defined
mechanisms. The complexity of creating applications and per-
forming system integration is mitigated through the use of a
domain-specific model-driven development process that relies
on a domain-specific modeling language and its accompanying
graphical modeling tools, software generators for synthesizing
infrastructure code, and the extensive use of model-based analysis
for verification and validation.
Index Terms—distributed systems, cyber-physical systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed real-time embedded systems that interact with
the physical world are ubiquitous and pervasive. We are
relying on an increasing number of such systems that provide
services to a large number of users. Fractionated spacecraft
(i.e., cluster of satellites) that performs wide-area sensing of
the Earth, swarms of UAVs that survey storm damage, and
the intelligent power devices that are essential for a ‘smart’
(power) grid are just a few illustrative examples for this
new generation of systems. While distributed and real-time
systems have been built for many decades, there are some
novel properties and requirements for the engineering of such
systems that we need to recognize and address.
First, we have to note that these systems are ‘cyber-
physical’, that is, they interact with the physical world. Hence
all software design, implementation, and verification decisions
should be guided by the fact that physics imposes timing
constraints on the computational and communication activ-
ities, and the implementation must obey these constraints.
Furthermore, as the software system may effect changes in
its physical environment these changes must verifiably satisfy
safety requirements for the overall system.
Second, we have to understand that these systems are
platforms. That is, they are increasingly built not as a single
use, single function network, but as networked platforms that
can be used by many, possibly concurrent users. The platform
is relatively stable and provide common core services to
all applications. However, the applications those run on the
platform change fairly regularly due to software updates or
because new applications have been developed. Figure 1 shows
a typical node of this distributed platform on the left, along
with a cloud of nodes that are communicating via a network
where at least one of the nodes has a communication link to
a control node. Nodes can join and leave the cloud during
operation.
Sensor Device Actuator
Processing/Storage Network
Control Node
Fig. 1: Typical node and cloud of nodes.
Third, these systems are used for distributed applications.
Applications typically span multiple nodes, for reasons related
to the availability of resources: some nodes may have sensors,
some may have actuators, some may have the computing
or storage resources, some applications need more than the
processing power available on one node. Therefore, applica-
tions that use these resources have to be architected such that
they rely on loosely connected, interacting components, run-
ning on different processors. Applications can be organically
assembled from components that provide specific services,
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2and components may be used (or re-used) by many active
applications. Obviously, the cluster of computing nodes runs
many applications concurrently.
Fourth, the platform is often a critical resource - possibly a
societal system, whose use must be carefully monitored and
controlled by a responsible owner. Therefore, these systems are
managed by some authority. Furthermore, as the platform can
be used and shared by many applications, possibly originating
from different organizations, the platform and thus the system
needs to be actively managed to avoid ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’ type failures. Additionally, because of the embedded
nature of the system, deployment and control of applications
need to ensure that the systems’ (often scarce) resources are
provisioned.
Fifth, security cannot be an afterthought. Information flows
in general and access to shared resources in particular should
be controlled under some overarching security policy. For
instance, high quality, sensitive customer data (from the elec-
tric grid) cannot be made available to untrusted applications
that are supplied by parties needing access to derived data
containing daily averages only – and those applications should
not have any means to access that high-grade, sensitive data.
Furthermore, applications supplied by users cannot be trusted,
and the platform must protect itself from abuse by such
applications. If multiple applications run on the platform
concurrently, and there is a need for some degree of data
sharing among the applications, the platform must permit that
while enforcing the security policies defined for the system.
Sixth, resilience is essential. Anything can go wrong at any
time: faults in the computing and communication hardware,
in the platform, in the application software. Moreover unan-
ticipated changes in the system (erroneous updates) or in the
environment must be survivable and the system should recover.
The system here includes both the platform, as well as the
distributed applications.
Reading the above list one might argue that existing cloud
computing platforms based on virtualization technologies al-
ready provide a solution for all these requirements. However,
this is not the case for the following reasons. Existing cloud
computing platforms were not designed with the requirements
of real-time embedded systems, where operating under re-
source constraints and timing requirements are essential. The
distributed applications here need to not only scale, but to
also satisfy timing and security requirements. Interactions with
physical devices (sensor, actuators, special purpose hardware)
is rarely an issue in conventional cloud computing platforms
– everything is virtualized, without consideration for the
management of resources that are part of the system but
not the computing platform. It appears that current cloud
computing platforms are not prepared for mission critical real-
time embedded systems, in general.
Arguably, the challenges listed above define a new a cat-
egory of systems that is emerging today. In this paper we
present some initial ideas and relevant research questions that
will hopefully be addressed by the research community. The
next section discusses the issues of an overall architecture for
such systems. The section following discusses the needs for a
development toolsuite, which is followed by a section on some
The Operating System kernel
System Libraries
Kernel Level Service Guarantees
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Fig. 2: Layered architecture of the software platform running
in each node of the distributed system. The guarantees (as-
sumed and provided) are indicated between the layers.
initial results. A review of relevant related work is followed
by a summary and conclusions.
II. PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE
We aim at building a reusable software platform that can
be applied across many application domains, and many pro-
cessing and communication platforms. The software platform
should provide solutions to core resource management prob-
lems, support security, and provide services that are application
independent.
This platform can be built as a multi-layer architecture that
addresses these issues, as shown on Fig 2. At the lowest level,
an operating system kernel provides the core resource sharing
and management functions, as well as the isolation from
hardware specific details. The kernel is typically accessed via
‘system libraries’ that provide a convenient interface to kernel
services. Layered upon this foundation there is a middleware
layer to provide higher-level, reusable communication (i.e.
messaging) and resource management services. The next layer
up provides the component abstractions, in order to support
component-oriented development or distributed applications.
The platform should provide services for application config-
uration and lifecycle management (the deployment manager),
for application control (the mission manager), for the handling
of faults arising during operations (the fault manager), and for
the management of resources (the resource manager). Note that
by ‘managers’ here we mean critical, privileged applications
that run outside of the core operating system, and provide
complex and long-term management services.
Note that a layered architecture helps with establishing
assurances for the overall systems. At the bottom, the hardware
layer provides guarantees about correct behavior (that was
verified by the hardware vendor). The kernel can assume these
and provide its own guarantees to the higher layers that, in
turn, provide their guarantees to the higher layers, etc.
3A. Platform kernel
At the lowest layer of the software platform, the kernel
encapsulates device drivers and provides processor scheduling
and networking features, but it also needs to address the real-
time, resilience, and security requirements of the application
domain. Borrowing language from the computer security com-
munity, the kernel has to be part of the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) that provides guarantees and is built and verified
to high-assurance standards [1].
Real-time requirements can be addressed by a number of
factors. Interrupt latencies (i.e. the worst-case delay elapsed
between the arrival of an interrupt and the release of an activity
the responds to that interrupt) should be bounded and known.
System calls should always be configurably time-bounded, and
should return with a timeout error in case of unexpected delays
to prevent the caller application from being unacceptably
delayed. The kernel should support a number of scheduling
policies that provide verifiable guarantees for timeliness of
task execution. Furthermore, it should allow application tasks
of different criticality levels to share the CPU. All tasks of
an application should run at the same criticality level and
this should be reflected in the available scheduling policies.
Because of the often critical nature of the applications, the
scheduling models provided by the kernel must support timing
analysis.
Schedulability analysis is very problematic in the most
general case, with completely unconstrained task behaviors.
However, it can become feasible when restrictions are placed
on the behavior of and the interaction amongst the tasks.
As discussed below, an application-level software component
model can provide such restrictions, such that the component-
level schedulability becomes manageable. However, the kernel
should be kept simple and provide only core scheduling
services that support potentially many component models.
According to experience, tasks should be able to operate within
a shared address space (i.e. threads) as well as separated
address spaces (i.e. processes). Finally, the kernel scheduler
should be able to take advantage of multi-core architectures
and be able to schedule tasks on different cores, possibly under
application control.
Communication links in a distributed system are a critical
resource, especially when they are scarce and highly dynamic,
as in mobile ad-hoc networks. Hence the communication
facilities, including the protocol stack, should be implemented
accordingly. As a minimum, the kernel should support a
multitude of transport protocols, preferably above a common
network protocol.
Real-time support must be available for the communications
as well. Datagrams (message blocks) should be time stamped
by the kernel such that message recipients are aware of the
message transfer delays. This necessitates clock synchroniza-
tion across the nodes; IEEE or IEEE 802.1AS can serve as
the facility to support that. Furthermore, the network layer
should support time-constrained real-time communications
with guarantees. For some classes of network traffic existing
best-effort approaches (like TCP/IP) are insufficient, and real-
time protocols are needed. The solution here necessitates a
multitude of network traffic classes, including sporadic but
highly critical traffic, guaranteed-bandwidth time triggered
traffic, rate constrained traffic, and best effort traffic1. The
kernel, as the ultimate resource manager is to support the
sharing of the communication link(s) and is to permit appli-
cations to select the traffic classes needed for their specific
network flows. Furthermore, if the communication channel is
not able to provide the expected performance anymore the
kernel should signal the application so that it can adapt to this
change.
Security (i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity) of
communications is a critical issue in some of the appli-
cation domains. On the lowest layers, features for secure
communication should be available, possibly supported by
the communication hardware itself and cryptography engines.
However, as the applications running on the platform are not
necessarily trusted, their communication capabilities need to
be constrained as well. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
with Multi Level Security (MLS) [2] on the network and
the messages may be necessary, in which case the kernel
has to provide support for (1) the trustworthy configuration
of network communications and (2) labeled communications
between parties. The first means that only privileged, trusted
service processes are permitted to configure the network
and the communication flows in the network. We expect
that untrusted processes are not permitted to simply open a
communication channel to the network and talk to any network
address – only trusted service processes can create the network
connections, and once initiated the communication endpoints
are handed over to the untrusted processes for use. The second
means that, following the principles of labeled communica-
tions, each message transmitter and receiver is provided with
a label set, by an external authority. These labels are to be
used in each communication operation by the application, and
their correct use is validated and enforced by the TCB. Note
that while these technologies have been originally developed
for government applications, security awareness on a shared
computing platform necessitates their use.
A communication flow is valid only between parties
with labels that satisfy the rule that information can
flow only from lower to higher or between equal la-
bels (according to the domination relation). Assuming
an increasing order of sensitivity: Confidential <
CompetitionSensitive < ManagementOnly, e.g., a
CompetitionSensitive process for mission A can read
Confidential or CompetitionSensitive data for
mission A, but not ManagementOnly data for mission A or
CompetitionSensitive data for mission B. When the
transmitter wishes to transfer a message, it has to supply a
message label that must match with one of the labels in its
own set, and satisfies the MLS rule. The kernel, which is part
of the TCB, performs this check on each message – both on the
transmitter and the receiver side. This machinery can ensure
that processes always follow the communication constraints
defined by a security policy.
1The standard SAE AS6802: Time-Triggered Ethernet has similar traffic
classes
4The operating system runs processes; both application and
service processes. To distinguish between these a capability
mechanism is needed that controls what operating system
services a process can use. For example, in order to prevent
the unchecked proliferation of application processes, only priv-
ileged processes should be permitted to create new processes.
When a process is created, its parent process should specify
what capabilities the child has, which can only be a subset of
the capabilities of the parent.
B. Platform services
As mentioned above, platform services are needed to per-
form management functions on the running system that are
outside of the scope of typical applications. Note that platform
services perform critical functions that require privileges,
hence the platform services are part of the TCB. We envision
at least four kinds of management services:
Deployment management: As stated in the introduction,
the envisioned systems are managed by some management
authority, presumably over a network connection. Each node
in the system has to have a service that can download, install,
configure, activate, teardown, and remove the distributed appli-
cations. This service is essentially the top-level configuration
manager for the node. Note that it itself should be fault-
tolerant (i.e. able to manage faults during the deployment
process), should obey and enforce security policies, and should
be responsive (per real-time requirements).
Mission management: Beyond deployment, there is a need
for a service to manage the execution of applications. One
should be able to activate and de-activate applications based
on triggering events or the elapse of time. Triggering events
can be generated by applications or the services. Mission man-
agement should include support for system auditing (including
logging control) and debugging.
Fault management: Resilience to faults is a core require-
ment for the system. We envision that the fault management
is autonomous: the system attempts to restore functionality, if
possible, without external intervention. Obviously, it may be
necessary that the system cannot manage a fault on its own,
and it has to contact its management authority. While fault
management is inherently a shared responsibility of all layers
(including applications), there are some system-level issues
that can be addressed by a dedicated service. For instance, if an
application unexpectedly terminates, a fault management reac-
tion could be an attempt to restart the application, and if that
fails then attempt to restart the application on another node,
the capability facilitated by a fault management service. Note
that the software platform is not to define fixed policies for
fault management (e.g. try restart five times, then re-allocate),
rather it is to provide mechanisms that allow implementing
any such policies (e.g. by scripting the behavior of the fault
manager service).
Resource management: Embedded systems are typically
resource constrained, hence unbounded resource usage can-
not be permitted. This can be strictly managed by a static
quota system, where developers declare the resource needs of
their applications, then a system integrator verifies that such
resource needs are acceptable (i.e. the application is ‘admissi-
ble’), and then the software platform enforces these quotas. If
the application attempts to obtain more resources than it was
declared, the request will fail (and the application has to handle
this failure). This method is too strict, however, and may
use resources very inefficiently. A resource manager service
can implement a more complex, dynamic resource allocation
policy, where applications can dynamically request and release
resources, and the service honors or rejects these requests
while maximizing system utility. Note that a critical resource
is network bandwidth (if it is limited and/or fluctuating), and
the dynamic management of communication bandwidth that
maximizes system utility is a challenge.
C. Middleware
All modern distributed software systems are built using mid-
dleware libraries that provide core communication abstractions
for object-based systems. These abstractions are to facilitate
prototypical component interactions. Industry standards and
pragmatic experience shows that a well-defined, small set of
interaction patterns can provide a solid foundation for building
applications. The set includes: (1) Point-to-point interactions
when when an object wants to invoke specific services of
another object. The interaction can be synchronous (call-
return) or asynchronous (call-callback). Note that the client
and server are coupled and are involved in bi-directional
messaging. (2) Publish-subscribe interactions when a pub-
lisher generates data samples, which are then asynchronously
consumed by interested subscribers. Note that the publishers
are loosely coupled, and not directly known to each other.
While additional, more complex interactions may also be
needed, the interactions should be facilitated in conjunction
with overall system requirements. For instance, the interactions
can be subject to timing constraints, and the scheduling of the
message exchanges should be done accordingly. The interac-
tions are also subject to the security policies - only permitted
information flows can be utilized to facilitate an interaction.
The interactions have to be implemented in conjunction with
the fault management architecture: objects participating in the
interactions must become aware of faults (originating from
the network, for instance), and should be able to rely on fault
tolerant services, if available.
D. Component model
We envision a component-oriented software development
for the platform. Obviously, this necessitates a precisely de-
fined abstract component model that helps developers to build
robust systems from reusable components. The implementa-
tion of the component model must rely on a robust component
framework that facilitates and mediates all interactions among
the components. The component model should clearly define
how component activities are scheduled, based on events or
the elapse of time, and what the component lifecycle is.
The component model is subject to all requirements men-
tioned above. It has to support real-time requirements: we want
to be able to predict the timing properties of the system based
on the timing properties of the components and their specific
5interactions. The component model should support security
policies, and should provide for fault management, including
anomaly detection, diagnosis, and fault mitigation.
III. DEVELOPMENT TOOLS
Developing code for modern software platforms (e.g. An-
droid or iOS) cannot be done without sophisticated tool
support. This issue is compounded by the complexity of
distributed systems, where not only code development has
to be done, but also complex configuration and allocation
decisions have to be made and implemented.
As discussed above, the platform supports a component
model with complex interaction semantics. Coding for such
a component model by hand is quite difficult and error prone,
hence higher-level abstractions, such as models, are needed.
There is a need for a modeling language specific for the
component model that is easy to use and mitigates accidental
complexity. Furthermore, the modeling language should fa-
cilitate the composition of applications from components. As
we are building a distributed system, the models should also
encompass the (static or dynamic) configuration of the network
with computing nodes and communication links. Many cross-
cutting aspects, like resource quotas, fault management strate-
gies, security labels for secure communications, etc. should
also be represented. Finally, the allocation of applications
to computing nodes and information flows to network links
should also be modeled, either explicitly (to support static
allocation) or implicitly (to support dynamic allocation).
In summary, we envision a wide-spectrum domain-specific
modeling language that covers all of the above areas. General
purpose modeling languages (e.g. UML) or their specializa-
tions (e.g. MARTE) solve only part of the problem, and
often in a somewhat cumbersome way, e.g. using stereotypes.
Arguably, a dedicated, platform-specific modeling language is
a better approach.
The development toolchain should be able to support both
conventional (code-oriented) and model-based development of
software components. The first one is needed for general
purpose components, while the second one opens up the
opportunity to use the results of model-based development
tools (like Simulink/Stateflow). Tool integration to ensure
semantic interoperability across development tools is essential.
Finally, the development tools should include tools for
checking the correctness of the modeled applications and
analyzing system properties including schedulability and the
ability to compare alternative deployment strategies.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
DREMS2 is a software infrastructure for designing, im-
plementing, configuring, deploying and managing distributed
real-time embedded systems that consists of two major subsys-
tems: (1) a design-time toolsuite for modeling, analysis, syn-
thesis, implementation, debugging, testing, and maintenance
of application software built from reusable components, and
(2) a run-time software platform for deploying, managing, and
operating application software on a network of computing
2http://www.isis.vanderbilt.edu/drems
nodes. The platform is tailored towards a managed network
of computers and distributed software applications running on
that network of nodes, i.e. a cluster.
The toolsuite supports a model-based paradigm of software
development for distributed, real-time, embedded systems
where modeling tools and generators automate the tedious
parts of software development and also provide a design-time
framework for the analysis of software systems. The run-
time software platform reduces the complexity and increases
the reliability of software applications by providing reusable
technological building blocks in the form of an operating
system, middleware, and application management services.
A. DREMS Architecture
DREMS is a complete, end-to-end solution for software
development: from modeling tools to code to deployed ap-
plications. It is open and extensible, and relies on open indus-
try standards, well-tested functionality and high-performance
tools. It focuses on the architectural issues of the software,
and promotes the modeling of application software, where the
models are directly used in the construction of the software.
Software applications running on the DREMS platform are
distributed: an application consists of one or more actors that
run in parallel, typically on different nodes of a network.
Actors specialize the concept of processes: they have identity
with state, can be migrated from node to node. Actors are
created, deployed, configured, and managed by a special
service of the run-time platform: the deployment manager - a
privileged, distributed, and fault tolerant actor, present on each
node of the system, that performs all management functions
for application actors. An actor can also be assigned a set of
limited resources of the node on which it runs: memory and
file space, a share of CPU time, and a share of the network
bandwidth.
Applications are built from software components - hosted
by actors - that only interact via well-defined interaction
patterns using security-labeled messages, and are allowed to
use specific sets of services provided by the operating system,
including messaging and thread synchronization operations.
Note that components use these indirectly: via the middleware.
The middleware libraries implement the high-level com-
munication abstractions: synchronous and asynchronous in-
teractions, on top of the low-level services provided by the
underlying distributed hardware platform. Interaction patterns
include (1) point-to-point interactions (in the form of syn-
chronous and asynchronous remote method invocations), and
(2) group communications (in the form of anonymous publish-
subscribe interactions). Component operations can be event-
driven or time-triggered, enabling time-driven applications.
Message exchanges via the low-level messaging services are
time-stamped, thus message receivers are aware of when the
message was sent. Hence temporal ordering of events can be
established (assuming the clocks of the computing nodes are
synchronized).
Specialized, verified platform actors provide system-wide
high-level services: application deployment, fault manage-
ment, controlled access to I/O devices, etc. Each application
6actor exposes the interface(s) of one or more of its components
that the components of applications can interact with using the
same interaction patterns. Applications can also interact with
each other the same way: exposed interfaces and precisely
defined interaction patterns.
The DREMS Operating System - a set of extensions to the
Linux kernel - implements all the critical low-level services
to support resource sharing (including spatial and temporal
partitioning), actor management, secure (labeled and managed)
information flows, and fault tolerance. A key feature of the OS
layer is support for temporal partitions (similar to the ARINC-
653 standard): actors can be assigned to a fixed duration,
periodically repeating interval of the CPU’s time so that they
have a guaranteed access to the processor in that interval.
In other words, the actors can have an assured bandwidth
to utilize the CPU and actors in separate temporal partitions
cannot inadvertently interfere with each other via the CPU.
B. Run-time Software Platform
The implementation of the run-time software platform has
several layers. Practically all layers are based on existing and
proven open-source technology. Starting from the bottom, the
operating system layer extends the Linux kernel with a number
of specific services, but it strongly relies on the code available
in the Linux kernel (currently: version 3.2.17). This permits
the use of DREMS services for the actors, but also keeps the
Linux system calls for debugging and monitoring purposes.
These extensions are in the form of 120+ new system calls.
The C and C++ run-time support libraries (based on uClibc3
and libstdcpp4 implement the conventional support services
needed by the typical C and C++ programs. The C run-time
library has entry points to access the DREMS OS system
calls. These calls utilize data structures that have been de-
fined using the standard OMG Interface Definition Language
(IDL), and can be created and manipulated using generated
constructor and manipulation operators. The implementation
of the DREMS operating system calls checks the integrity
of all data structures passed on the interface. This enables
validation of the data structures on the interface, preventing
potential abuse of the system calls.
Layered on the C and C++ run-time libraries the Adap-
tive Communication Environment (ACE) libraries provide a
low-overhead isolation layer for the higher level middleware
elements that support CORBA and DDS. The CORBA imple-
mentation is based on The ACE ORB (TAO, currently: version
6.1.4) that implements a subset of the CORBA standard
for facilitating point-to-point interactions between distributed
objects. Such interactions are in the form of Remote Method
Invocations (RMIs) or Asynchronous Method Invocations
(AMIs). RMIs follow the call-return semantics, where the
caller waits until the server responds, while the AMIs follow
the call-return-callback semantics, where the caller continues
immediately and the response from the server is handled by a
registered callback operation of the client. The CORBA subset
implemented by the middleware has been selected to support
3www.uclibc.org
4http://gcc.gnu.org/libstdc++/
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Fig. 3: Component-based distributed system example
a minimal set of core functions that are suitable for resource-
constrained embedded systems. The DDS implementation is
based on the OpenDDS (currently: version 3.4) that imple-
ments a subset of the DDS standard for facilitating anony-
mous publish/subscribe interactions among distributed objects.
There are several quality-of-service attributes associated with
publishers and subscribers that control features like buffering,
reliability, delivery rate, etc. DDS is designed to be highly
scalable, and its implementations meet the requirements of
mission-critical applications.
CORBA and DDS provide for data exchange and basic
interactions between distributed objects, but in DREMS ob-
jects are packaged into higher-level units called components.
A component [3] publishes and subscribes to various topics
(possibly many), implements (provides) interface(s), and ex-
pects (requires) implementations of other interfaces. Note that
a component may contain several, tightly coupled objects.
Components may expose parts of their observable state via
read-only state variables, accessible through specific methods.
Components are configured via configurable parameters. Their
operations are scheduled based on events or elapse of time.
An event can be the arrival of a message the component
has subscribed to or an incoming request on a provided
interface. Time triggering is done by associating a timer
with the component that invokes a selected operation on
the component when a set amount of time elapses, possibly
periodically repeating the operation. Component operations
can perform computations, publish messages, and call out
to other components via the required interfaces. To avoid
having to write complex locking and synchronization logic for
components, component operations are always single threaded:
inside of one component at most one thread can be active at
any time. Actors are formed from interacting components, and
applications are formed from actors that interact with each
other via their interacting components. Actors (together with
their components) can be deployed on different nodes of a
network, but their composition and interactions are always
clearly defined: they must happen either via remote method
invocations or via publish/subscribe interactions.
Figure 3 shows an application where a Sensor component
periodically (P) publishes a message that a GPS component
subscribes to, and which, in turn, sporadically (S) publishes
another message that a NAVDisplay component consumes.
This last component invokes the GPS component via a pro-
vided interface, when it needs to refresh its own state. The
messages published can be quite small, while the method
invocation (that happens less frequently, and on demand) may
7transfer larger amounts of data.
The run-time software platform includes a key platform
actor: the Deployment Manager (DM) that instantiates, con-
figures, activates, deactivates, and dismantles applications.
Every node on a network has a copy of the DM that acts
as a controller for all applications on that node. The DMs
communicate with each other, with one being the lead ‘clus-
ter’ DM. This, cluster leader orchestrates the deployment of
applications across cluster with the help of the node DMs. For
deployment, the binaries of application components should be
installed on each node, then the cluster lead DM is provided
a deployment plan that is generated from application models
and executes the plan, coordinating the activities of node level
DMs which start the actors, installs components, configures the
network connections among the components, etc., and finally
activates the components. This last step releases the execution
threads of the components. When the applications need to
be removed, the DM stops the components, withdraws the
network configuration, and stops the actors. A key feature
of the deployment process is that the network connections
among the parts: i.e. actors and components of the distributed
application are managed: the application business logic does
not have to deal with this problem; everything is set up based
on the deployment plan.
C. Design-time Development Platform
Configuring the middleware and writing code that takes
advantage of the component framework is a highly non-trivial
and tedious task. To mitigate this problem and to enable
programmer productivity, a model-driven development envi-
ronment is available that simplifies the tasks of the application
developers and system integrators.
In this environment, developers define via graphical and
textual models various properties of the application, including:
interface and message types, components types (in terms
interfaces and publish/subscribe message types), component
implementations, component assemblies, and applications (in
terms interacting components and actors containing them). Ad-
ditionally, the hardware platform for the cluster are modeled:
processors, network and device interfaces, network addresses,
etc. Finally, the deployment of the application(s) on the
hardware platform are also modeled, as the mapping of actors
onto hardware nodes, and information flows onto network
links. Models are processed by code generators that produce
several artifacts from them: source code, configuration files,
build system artifacts that facilitate the automated compilation
and linking of the components, and other documents. The
application developer is expected to provide the component
implementation code in the form of C++ code (currently, in
the future: any other, supported executable language) and add
it to the generated code. The compilation and debugging of
the applications can happen with the help of a conventional
development environment (currently: Eclipse) that supports
editing, compiling, and debugging the code. The result of this
process is a set of component executables and the deployment
plan - ready to be deployed on a cluster of nodes.
The model-driven approach has several benefits. (1) The
model serves as the single source of all structural and con-
figuration information for the system. (2) The tedious work
of crafting middleware ‘glue’ code and configuration files for
deployment is automated: everything is derived programmat-
ically from the models. (3) The models provide an explicit
representation of the architecture of all the applications run-
ning on the system - this enables architectural and performance
analysis on the system before it is executed. (4) Models can
also be used for rapidly creating ‘mockup’ components and
applications for rapid prototyping and evaluation.
D. Example: Cluster flight control and sensor processing
We have evaluated the DREMS prototype on several exam-
ples. The graphical modeling tool runs on Windows, the code
development and cross-compilation tools on a Linux platform,
while DREMS is on a set of networked embedded x86-
based devices (3 iBX-530 industrial computers). Deployment
and configuration is done from the Linux machine, via the
network. Several small scale tests were used to validate that the
platform is functional. A more realistic application involved
a distributed flight control software applications (2 actors on
each node, with 3-4 components each), and a sensor processing
application (dissimilar actors on each node). The flight con-
trol actors share critical, but low-bandwidth data, the sensor
application shares high bandwidth, but low criticality data.
The two sets of applications run in different security domains,
and in different temporal partitions. We were scheduling the
applications in partitions of 100 msec duration, and were
experimenting with variable bandwidth between the nodes. All
designed and implemented features were functional, including
component interactions, partition scheduling, security labeling
and information flow separation, application deployment and
control. The applications have been constructed using the
model-driven development toolchain; the model had about
100 distinct elements. Component code was hand inserted
into the skeleton code generated by the software generators,
followed by compilation using Eclipse with a cross-compiler
for the platform. The model-driven generation produced all
the infrastructure code, simplifying the task of the developer.
A detailed report of this experiments can be found in [4].
V. RELATED WORK
There are several architecture description languages for
embedded systems, including the Architecture Analysis and
Design Language (AADL) [5], SysML [6] and the Modeling
and Analysis of Realtime and Embedded (MARTE) [7]
systems profile for UML. These are general purpose modeling
languages that can be used across a wide variety of systems.
Because of specific features that are tightly integrated into
our system, such as security labels and partition scheduling,
we designed a dedicated domain-specific modeling language
to describe DREMS systems and applications. However, au-
tomated transformation from our modeling language to these
general purpose languages is possible and may be used to
leverage some of their analysis capabilities.
A similar toolsuite that also uses a domain-specific approach
for component-based systems is described in [8]. That work
focuses primarily on support for highly dynamic environments
8that require adaptation, and hence their environment supports
dynamic updating and reconfiguration of models based on
feedback from the running system. The biggest differences
between that work and DREMS are that DREMS supports
multiple messaging semantics and has built-in support for
security in both the kernel and middleware layers.
Our previous work in modeling component-based systems
includes the CoSMIC [9], [10] tool suite, which assists
with the model-based development, configuration and deploy-
ment of CORBA Component Model-based applications. While
DREMS is more extensive than CoSMIC and provides the
ability to model elements like hardware and task schedules,
experience from the CoSMIC project helped guide certain
design aspects of component modeling inside DREMS.
The ARINC-653 Component Model (ACM) [11], which
implements a component model for the ARINC-653 stan-
dard [12] for avionics computing, forms the basis for the
DREMS component model. DREMS extends the temporal
partitioning scheduling method used by ACM by allowing
multiple actors (processes) per temporal partition, a valuable
feature for components that interact through synchronous mes-
sages. Further, the DREMS component model is designed to
promote deadlock/race condition-free behavior in components.
The secure transport feature of DREMS is based on multi-
level security (MLS) [2]. All messages have a security label
and must obey a set of mandatory access control (MAC)
policies. The main novelty in DREMS with respect to MLS
is the concept of multi-domain labels [13] to support secure
communication among actors from different organizations.
A more detailed description of the system requirements for
DREMS and design principles used to meet those requirements
is available in [14].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
DREMS is a prototype, end-to-end solution for building
and running distributed real-time embedded applications. It
contains not only a run-time framework with a state-of-
the-art operating system extended with special features for
resource, application, and network management together with
a component framework with a precisely defined model of
computation, but also a model-driven development toolchain
that assists developers and integrators in managing the devel-
opment process.
But DREMS is only a partial prototype for a class of soft-
ware platforms outlined in the first two sections. We believe
that such software platforms are essential for implementing
the next generation of distributed real-time embedded systems.
Embedded systems are not black boxes anymore, but rather
platforms with an evolving and dynamically changing software
ecosystem.
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